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INTRODUCTION
With its May 31, 2005 decision in Arthur Andersen LLP v. United
States,1 the Supreme Court, with one fell swoop, overturned the
"poster-child case of all the corporate fraud cases."'2 When the dust
settled, the result was an injured Department of Justice in one corner
and approximately 28,000 lost Arthur Andersen jobs in the other.3
Partly responsible for this result, according to then-Chief Justice Wil-
liam H. Rehnquist, was the "striking[ly] ... little culpability the [ury]
instructions required."4 Not only did the trial court improperly in-
struct the jury on the meaning of "corruptly"5-the statutory mens rea
requirement for the crime-the instructions also "led the jury to be-
lieve that it did not have to find any nexus between the 'persua[sion]'
to destroy documents and any particular proceeding." 6 Although the
Court clearly indicated that the government must prove some sort of
"nexus" between the defendant's acts and the allegedly obstructed ju-
dicial proceeding to convict a defendant in a witness tampering prose-
cution, the Court ultimately failed to explain exactly what that nexus
would entail. 7
The federal criminal statutes pertaining to obstruction of justice
are codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1520.8 Section 1503, the "Omnibus
Clause,"9 is the general obstruction of justice provision, which pros-
cribes obstruction of justice toward judicial officers, grand and petit
jurors, and witnesses. 10 The witness tampering provisions of the ob-
struction statutes are broadly codified under § 1512,11 with the provi-
sions at issue in Arthur Andersen found in § 1512(b) (2) (A) and (B). 1 2
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 added §§ 1512(c) and 1519, and in-
1 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
2 Charles Lane, Justices Overturn Andersen Conviction: Advice to Enron Jury on Account-
ants'Intent Is Faulted, WASH. POST, June 1, 2005, at Al (quoting William B. Mateja, former
member of the corporate fraud task force of the Department of Justice).
3 See id. (explaining that as of June 1, 2005, Arthur Andersen employed "a staff of
only 200 left out of the 28,000 people who once worked there").
4 Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 706.
5 See id. at 706-07.
6 Id. at 707 (alteration in original).
7 See id. at 707-08 (affirming the "nexus" requirement without further explanation
or guidance).
8 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1520 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); see also Alan E. Garfield,
Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 261, 307 n.238
(1998) (noting that §§ 1501-1517 define various actions that amount to obstruction of
justice).
9 See United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 695 (10th Cir. 1993).
10 See 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000) ("Whoever corruptly ... influences, obstructs, or im-
pedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice,
shall be punished. .. ").
tt See id. § 1512 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
12 Id. § 1512(b) (2) (A), (B) (2000); Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 698. The statute at
issue in Arthur Andersen states:
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creased criminal penalties for witness tampering in the form of docu-
ment destruction. 13
Supreme Court decisions have struggled to define the contours
of the broad language of the § 1503 Omnibus Clause. One such case,
United States v. Aguilar, recognized the need to "place metes and
bounds on the very broad language of the catchall provision."1 4 In
Aguilar, a case involving false disclosures during a grand-jury investiga-
tion, the Court considered, among other things, the necessary con-
nection between the defendant's action and the allegedly obstructed
judicial proceedings. 15 Specifically, the Court held that the defen-
dant's act must have a "nexus" with the judicial proceedings or the
"'natural and probable effect' of interfering with the due administra-
tion of justice."1 6 Unfortunately, the Court did not specify whether
and how the nexus requirement would apply to witness tampering
cases. 
17
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly per-
suades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading
conduct toward another person, with intent to-...
(2) cause or induce any person to-
(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other
object, from an official proceeding;
(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to im-
pair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official
proceeding; ...
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both.
§ 1512(b) (2) (A), (B).
13 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1102, 116 Stat. 745, 807
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (Supp. IV 2004)). This section of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
provides:
(c) Whoever corruptly-
(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or
other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the
object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceed-
ing, or attempts to do so,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or
both.
Id.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also added:
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies,
or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the
intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper admin-
istration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency
of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or
contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 802(a), 116 Stat. 745, 800 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Supp. IV 2004)).
14 United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995).
15 See id. at 599-600.
16 Id. at 599 (quoting United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 695 (10th Cir. 1993)).
17 See Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 707-08.
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When Arthur Andersen came before the Court, the issue of apply-
ing the nexus requirement to witness tampering cases remained un-
resolved. The Court did offer slightly more guidance in that case,
however, by holding that the § 1512 witness tampering jury instruc-
tions were faulty in part due to a lack of "any type of nexus element."1 8
Although the Court discussed the Aguilar holding, 19 it neglected to
clarify precisely how the nexus requirement would apply to witness
tampering-as opposed to general obstruction of justice-cases. 20
As the Court's "any type of nexus element" 2' language implies,
there are many possible readings of what "nexus" might be required-
the "type" of nexus at issue is not always clear, as proved especially
true in Arthur Andersen. Courts tend to broadly define "nexus" as re-
quiring "knowledge of a pending proceeding" or as requiring that the
defendant's act have the "natural and probable effect" of interfering
with a pending proceeding. 22 Unlocking the intricacies of these
broad definitions of the "nexus requirement" is a necessary step in
determining what the Arthur Andersen Court meant in its application
of "nexus" to witness tampering cases.
Although the circuit courts of appeals appear to agree that Arthur
Andersen does require a "nexus,"23 they have remained unhelpful in
clarifying the meaning of the concept. The Eleventh Circuit, without
elaborating, has simply restated the Arthur Andersen holding.2 4 When
faced with this issue, the Second Circuit declined to answer the ques-
tion by finding that it was not at issue. 25 The First Circuit has gone
slightly further by pointing out that Arthur Andersen did not address
whether the nexus requirement applies to § 1512 with the same force
as to § 1503.26 The Third and Seventh Circuits have gone even fur-
ther by discussing jury instructions that they found to satisfy the Arthur
18 Id. at 707.
19 See id. at 708 (acknowledging that the Court in Aguilar "held that § 1503 required
something more-specifically, a 'nexus' between the obstructive act and the proceeding"
(citation omitted)).
20 See id. at 707-08.
21 Id. at 707.
22 See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995).
23 See, e.g., United States v. Starks, 472 F.3d 466, 469-70 (7th Cir. 2006); United States
v. Ronda, 455 F.3d 1273, 1284-88 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Vampire Nation, 451
F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Darif, 446 F.3d 701, 711 (7th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 170-71, 176 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v.
Byrne, 435 F.3d 16, 23-25 (1st Cir. 2006).
24 See Ronda, 455 F.3d at 1287-88 (noting that Arthur Andersen required that "the acts
of obstruction relate to 'an official proceeding'" but holding that the nexus requirement
does not apply with equal force to § 1512(b)(3) (citing Byrne, 435 F.3d at 24)).
25 See Quattrone, 441 F.3d at 176 n.22 ("The question of whether the nexus require-
ment applies in the same way to section 1512(b) as it does to sections 1503 and 1505 is not
relevant to resolution of this appeal.").
26 See Byrne, 435 F.3d at 25 ("[T] he Arthur Andersen court did not elaborate on the
particularity required by the nexus requirement in subsection (b) (2).").
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Andersen nexus requirement.27 Thus, although some of the courts of
appeals have addressed this issue, none have provided concrete gui-
dance to resolve it.
However the Arthur Andersen Court intended to define the nexus
requirement, it is necessary to consider the importance of that deci-
sion in the first place. The decision reminded one commentator of
the Woody Allen line that "[s]ex without love is an empty experi-
ence . . .but as empty experiences go, it's one of the best."28 John
Hasnas argues that the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 200229
rendered the Arthur Andersen decision essentially meaningless. 30 At
the same time, Hasnas asserts that despite this meaninglessness, the
case significantly demonstrates the Court's intent to rein in
prosecutorial discretion.3 1 Although the addition of §§ 1512(c) and
1519 by Sarbanes-Oxley seem to provide prosecutors with "greater
power, lower requirements of proof, and increased penalties,' '3 2 they
remain fresh statutes that do not provide the certainty of § 1512(b),
especially given the holding in Arthur Andersen. It remains to be seen
whether Sarbanes-Oxley will render § 1512(b) "a dead letter."33
This Note examines the Aguilar obstruction of justice nexus re-
quirement as applied to witness tampering and document destruction
statutes in the wake of Arthur Andersen and Sarbanes-Oxley. In particu-
lar, this Note analyzes the Court's implicit intention in both Aguilar
and Arthur Andersen to apply stricter constraints on prosecutors and
courts that confront document destruction cases. Part I outlines the
relevant obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and document de-
struction statutes. Part II begins by examining the Court's use of the
nexus requirement-particularly in the context of its holdings in
Aguilar and Arthur Andersen-and then considers subsequent opinions
by the courts of appeals that have discussed the nexus requirement in
light of the Arthur Andersen holding. Part III investigates subsequent
case law and commentary surrounding the nexus requirement, along
with relevant constitutional and practical considerations. The Note
27 See Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d at 205 (finding no plain error in jury instructions
under Arthur Andersen where trial court instructed the jury "that [the defendant] could be
found guilty of witness tampering only if he acted with the specific intent to induce [an-
other person] to withhold evidence from an official proceeding"); Darif 446 F.3d at 712
(finding jury instructions sufficient because they made "clear to the jury that the witness
tampering charge was related to 'a particular proceeding'"); see also Starks, 472 F.3d at
469-70 (implicitly acknowledging that Arthur Andersen requires a nexus).
28 John Hasnas, The Significant Meaninglessness of Arthur Andersen LLP v. United
States, 2005 CATO Sup. CT. REV. 187, 187 (alteration in original).
29 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scat-
tered sections of Titles 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 of the United States Code).
30 See Hasnas, supra note 28, at 192-94.
31 See id. at 194-212.
32 Id. at 194.
.33 Id.
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concludes that the best reading of Aguilar and Arthur Andersen requires
strict application of the nexus element-that the defendant's act have
the "natural and probable effect" of interfering with a pending pro-
ceeding-to § 1512(b) and Sarbanes-Oxley document destruction
prosecutions.
I
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, WITNESS TAMPERING, AND
DOCUMENT DESTRUCTION: STATUTORY LAW
A. The Omnibus Clause
Obstruction ofjustice is "[i] nterference with the orderly adminis-
tration of law and justice, as by giving false information to or withhold-
ing evidence from a police officer or prosecutor, or by harming or
intimidating a witness or juror."3 4 The federal obstruction of justice
criminal statutes are located in Title Eighteen of the United States
Code, §§ 1501-1520. 35 The more important obstruction of justice
provisions include the definitions section and the Omnibus Clause, as
well as provisions dealing with obstruction of proceedings before de-
partments, agencies, and committees; obstruction of criminal investi-
gations; witness tampering; and retaliating against a witness, victim, or
an informant. 36 The Omnibus Clause of § 1503 serves as the general
obstruction ofjustice statute, 37 while § 1512 has traditionally served as
the general witness tampering statute.38
Section 1503(a) is codified under the broad heading of
"[i] nfluencing or injuring officer or juror generally"39 and applies in
two ways. The first part of § 1503(a) proscribes any effort to corruptly
influence, or to influence by threats or force, any grand juror, petit
juror, or court officer. 40 The second part, the Omnibus Clause,
broadly protects the "due administration of justice. ' '4 '
34 BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1107 (8th ed. 2004).
35 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1520 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
36 Id. § 1503 (2000) (Omnibus Clause); id. § 1505 (Supp. IV 2004) (obstruction of
proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees); id. § 1510 (2000) (obstruc-
tion of criminal investigations); id. § 1512 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (witness tampering); id.
§ 1513 (retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant); id. § 1515 (2000)
(definitions).
37 See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 598 (1995) ("[T]he 'Omnibus Clause'
serves as a catchall, prohibiting persons from endeavoring to influence, obstruct, or im-
pede the due administration ofjustice.").
38 See United States v. Hernandez, 730 F.2d 895, 898 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing the
congressional intent to create more extensive protections against witness tampering exclu-
sively by enacting § 1512).
39 § 1503 (2000).
40 See id. § 1503(a).
41 Id.
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A number of the circuit courts of appeals have held that the re-
strictive language preceding the Omnibus Clause does not limit its
general language. 42 Rather, the Omnibus Clause proscribes an exten-
sive class of conduct that interferes with the judicial process. 43 In
1995, the Supreme Court held that the Omnibus Clause is essentially a
"catchall .... far more general in scope than the earlier clauses of the
statute. '44 The Court has placed some limits on the Omnibus Clause,
however, by holding that the obstructive conduct must have the "natu-
ral and probable" effect of interfering with the due administration of
justice.45
The Omnibus Clause of § 1503 provides that "[w]hoever cor-
ruptly... influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence,
obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be pun-
ished. ' 46 The mens rea required to violate the Omnibus Clause is
"corruptly. '47 A defendant may satisfy the actus reus element of the
crime by "influenc[ing], obstruct[ing], or imped[ing], or en-
deavor[ing] to influence, obstruct, or impede. '48 Finally, the result
element involves obstruction of the "due administration of justice."49
In any case other than a killing or an attempted killing, § 1503 calls
for "imprisonment for not more than 10 years, a fine .... or both. 50
Conviction under § 1503 requires pendency of ajudicial proceed-
ing51 and some connection between the obstruction of a government
investigation or official proceeding and the pending judicial proceed-
42 Lisa R. Rafferty &Julie Teperow, Obstruction ofJustice, 35 Am. CRIM. L. Rtv. 989, 992
(1998) (citing cases).
43 Id. (citing United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 650 (11th Cir. 1990) ("any [cor-
rupt] act" which obstructs justice); United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200, 205-06 (5th Cir.
1979) (false testimony to a grand jury); United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1333-35
(5th Cir. 1978) (coercion ofjudge to disclose secret grand jury testimony); United States v.
Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 679-81 (3d Cir. 1975) (destruction of evidence for grand jury
investigation)).
44 United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 598 (1995). Before the Supreme Court's
decision in Aguilar, the Ninth Circuit applied the canon of statutory construction of ejusdem
generis in interpreting the Omnibus Clause to proscribe only acts similar to those that the
restrictive language of the first clause of § 1503(a) prohibited. See United States v. Aguilar,
21 F.3d 1475, 1486 n.9 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 515 U.S. 593 (1995). Ejusdem generis provides
that "when a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase
will be interpreted to include only items of the same type as those listed." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 556 (8th ed. 2004).
45 Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599; see Rafferty & Teperow, supra note 42, at 992.
46 § 1503(a).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 d.
50 Id. § 1503(b).
51 See, e.g., United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 1370 (6th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Nelson, 852 F.2d 706, 709 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 485 (2d
Cir. 1985); United States v. McComb, 744 F.2d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 1984).
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ing.52 Moreover, a pending investigation by a grand jury constitutes a
judicial proceeding under § 1503.53 The temporal determination of
the point at which a proceeding becomes "pending" has varied
throughout the circuits. 54
Other elements of a § 1503 violation include a knowledge re-
quirement and a "nexus" requirement. To establish a § 1503 viola-
tion, the government must prove that the defendant knew of the
pending judicial proceeding. 5 5 Lack of knowledge of a pending judi-
cial proceeding would indicate that the requisite intent to obstruct
justice is also absent.5 6 In addition, the intent element of § 1503 in-
cludes a "nexus" element requiring that "the act ... have a relation-
ship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceedings. In
other words, the endeavor must have the 'natural and probable effect'
of interfering with the due administration of justice. ' 57
Before the Court's decision in Arthur Andersen, the courts of ap-
peals employed varying definitions of the term "corruptly."58 Al-
52 See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475, 1483-84 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 515
U.S. 593 (1995) (holding that statements made to FBI agents did not fall under § 1503
because the defendant did not know that they would be provided to a grand jury); United
States v. Tham, 960 F.2d 1391, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992) (ruling that a defendant cannot be
convicted under § 1503 merely for hindering an FBI function); United States v. Brown, 688
F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1982) (concluding that § 1503 does not proscribe mere interfer-
ence with a search warrant execution).
Obstruction of a congressional, federal department, or federal agency investigation
falls under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
53 See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 990 (1st Cir. 1987); McComb, 744 F.2d at 560; United States v. Vesich,
724 F.2d 451, 454 (5th Cir. 1984).
54 See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 837 F.2d 1031, 1034 (11th Cir. 1988) (case
deemed pending even after sentencing due to the availability of avenues for appeal);
United States v. Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485, 1490-91 (9th Cir. 1985) (proceeding
pending despite the fact that a complaint had not been filed, where the defendant waived
trial and sentencing rights with assistance of counsel); Vesich, 724 F.2d at 455-56 (proceed-
ing pending where a grand jury had been empaneled and a witness had signed an agree-
ment to testify); United States v. Ellis, 652 F. Supp. 1451, 1452-53 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (no
proceeding pending where the U.S. Attorney had empaneled a grand jury but had not
issued any subpoenas nor informed the grand jury of the investigation).
55 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 977 (5th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Guzzino, 810 F.2d 687, 696 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ardito, 782 F.2d 358, 360-62
(2d Cir. 1986).
56 See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599.
57 Id. (citations omitted).
58 See Rafferty & Teperow, supra note 42, at 995-96 (discussing the historical develop-
ment of the term "corrupt").
The First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits defined "corruptly" as requiring, at least in part,
a corrupt motive. See, e.g., United States v. Barfield, 999 F.2d 1520, 1524 (11th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1990); Cintolo, 818 F.2d at 991-92;
United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1336 n.9 (5th Cir. 1978). Other circuits had held
that "corruptly" simply meant that the act must have been "done with the purpose of ob-
structing justice." United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 1981); see also
United States v. Machi, 811 F.2d 991, 996 (7th Cir. 1987) (approving ajury instruction that
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though the Court in Arthur Andersen was construing the meaning of
"knowingly . .. corruptly persuad[e]" under § 1512(b),5 9 it neverthe-
less clarified the meaning of "corrupt" and "corruptly" as "normally
associated with wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil." 60 Moreover, ac-
tual obstruction is not necessary to sustain a § 1503 conviction; a mere
"endeavor" to obstruct justice is sufficient.61 Courts have defined "en-
deavor" in this context as "any effort or essay to accomplish the evil
purpose that the [statute] was enacted to prevent."6 2
B. Witness Tampering
Despite the § 1503 Omnibus Clause and its broad applicability,
both Congress and prosecutors realized that protection for witness
tampering victims remained deficient. 63 Congress found that the stat-
utory construction of § 1503 was problematic because it offered lim-
ited protection and forced prosecutors to satisfy difficult threshold
requirements. 6 4 Among other problems, Congress noted that § 1503
only protected witnesses rather than other persons who might be in-
volved in ajudicial proceeding-including victims and individuals not
called as active witnesses. 65 Furthermore, Congress understood that
the threshold requirements of § 1503, such as the requirement that a
pending judicial proceeding exist at the time that the defendant ac-
ted, essentially provided easy means for a defendant to escape prose-
cution. 66 The passage of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of
1982,67 codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1512, led one commentator to state
to act "corruptly" means "to act with the purpose of obstructing justice"); United States v.
Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 679 (6th Cir. 1985) (same).
59 See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 703-06 (2005).
60 Id. at 705.
61 See 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2000); United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 695 (10th Cir.
1993); Barfield, 999 F.2d at 1522-23; United States v. Bashaw, 982 F.2d 168, 172 (6th Cir.
1992); Thomas, 916 F.2d at 651; United States v. Buffalano, 727 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1984).
62 Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 333 (1966) (quoting United States v. Russell,
255 U.S. 138, 143 (1921)).
63 See Brian M. Haney, Note, Contrasting the Prosecution of Witness Tampering Under 18
U.S.C. § 1503 and 18 U.S.C. § 1512: Why § 1512 Better Serves the Government at Trial, 9 SuF-
FOLK J. TRIAL & APP. Anvoc. 57, 61 (2004) (citing Tina M. Riley, Note, Tampering with
Witness Tampering: Resolving the Quandary Surrounding 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1512, 77 WASH. U.
L.Q. 249, 255 (1999) (discussing congressional motivations underlying § 1512)).
64 See Riley, supra note 63, at 255 (citing S. REP. No. 97-532, at 14-15 (1982), reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2520-21).
65 See S. REP. No. 97-532, at 10, 14-15.
66 See Haney, supra note 63, at 63 (citing Teresa Anne Pesce, Note, Defining Witness
Tampering Under 18 U.S.C. Section 1512, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1417, 1419-20 (1986) (listing
witness tampering prosecution elements)); see also S. REP. No. 97-532, at 14-15 (acknowl-
edging § 1503's high threshold).
67 Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248.
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that "[u]nder § 1503 Congress provided only an ax to fight witness
tampering, but under § 1512 it gave prosecutors a scalpel." 68
Witness tampering is "[tihe act or an instance of obstructing jus-
tice by intimidating, influencing, or harassing a witness before or after
the witness testifies." 69 The federal witness tampering provisions are
generally codified under § 1512 as "[t]ampering with a witness, victim,
or an informant. '70 Section 1512(a) criminalizes witness tampering
with the threat or use of violence.71 Section 1512(b), the provision
that the government has traditionally used to prosecute document de-
struction cases, 72 applies to "[w]hoever knowingly uses intimidation,
threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do
so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person. ' 73 Sec-
tion 1512(c) is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act addition74 to witness tampering
law and mainly applies to document destruction cases.7 5 Section
1512(d) criminalizes the actions of "[w]hoever intentionally harasses
another person and thereby hinders, delays, prevents, or dissuades
any person from" appearing before an official proceeding, law en-
forcement officer, or United States judge.76 The sections following
§ 1512(d) act as modifiers to § 1512 and do not add separate substan-
tive crimes.77
Congress intended § 1512(b) to apply to noncoercive-in addi-
tion to coercive-witness tampering cases and, thus, included the
term "corruptly."78 To obtain a conviction for noncoercive witness
tampering under § 1512(b), the government must prove that the de-
fendant (a) knowingly, (b) corruptly persuaded or attempted to do
so, or engaged in misleading conduct, (c) toward another person, and
68 See Haney, supra note 63, at 64.
69 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1634 (8th ed. 2004).
70 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
71 See id. § 1512(a)(1) (covering the acts of "[w]hoever kills or attempts to kill an-
other person"); id. § 1512(a) (2) (covering the acts of "[w]hoever uses physical force or the
threat of physical force against any person, or attempts to do so"); id. § 1512 (a) (3) (setting
forth punishments).
72 See Dana E. Hill, Note, Anticipatory Obstruction ofJustice: Pre-Emptive Document Destruc-
tion Under the Sarbanes-Oxe
, 
Anti-Shredding Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
1519, 1533 (2004).
73 § 1512(b).
74 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1102, 116 Stat. 745, 807.
75 See § 1512(c).
76 Id. § 1512(d).
77 See id. § 1512(e) (affirmative defense); id. § 1512(f) (pendency of official proceed-
ing and admissibility of objects); id. § 1512(g) (state of mind); id. § 1512(h) (extraterrito-
rial federal jurisdiction); id. § 1512(i) (jurisdictional venue); id. § 1512(j) (maximum term
of imprisonment). But see id. § 1512(k) (dealing with conspiracy).
78 See id. § 1512(b); see also Richard M. Strassberg & Roberto M. Braceras, 'Corruptly
Persuading' the Obstruction ofJustice, 16 WHITE-COLLAR CIME REP., May 2002, at 1, 4 (discuss-
ing the history of § 1512 and its amendment to include language targeting noncoercive
witness tampering).
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(d) with the intent that the other person should act to obstruct jus-
tice.7  In addition, § 1512(b) (3), which applies to obstructing the
communication of certain information to government officials, does
not include the "official proceeding" requirement.8 0 Section
1512(b) (2) (A) and (B) have been the traditional subsections under
which the government has prosecuted witness tampering cases.8 '
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act added § 1512 (c) to the government's wit-
ness tampering arsenal in response to the recent corporate document
destruction scandals. 82 Some commentators suggest that § 1512(c)
will become the Omnibus Clause equivalent in witness tampering
prosecution. 83 Section 1512(c) affords the government several advan-
tages in prosecuting a document destruction case: (1) it does not re-
quire the government to pursue the "persuader" to obtain a
conviction; (2) it does not require that the perpetrator act "know-
ingly" in addition to "corruptly"; and (3) it carries twice the maximum
penalty of § 1512(b). 8 4
C. Document Destruction Under § 1519
The Sarbanes-Oxley addition of § 151985 subjects
[w]hoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up,
falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible
object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investi-
gation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdic-
tion of any department or agency of the United States . .. or in
relation to or contemplation of any such matter
to up to twenty years' imprisonment.8 6 Section 1519-along with
§ 1512(c)-will provide a very useful tool for prosecutors in the fu-
ture.8 7 Section 1519 does not require that the defendant act "cor-
ruptly," but merely that the defendant "knowingly" destroy documents
with intent to hamper a federal investigation. 88 Moreover, § 1519 re-
quires only that the defendant engage in document destruction "in
79 See § 1512(b).
80 See id. § 1512(b)(3).
81 See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 696, 702-03 (2005).
The full text of the relevant statutory provision is reproduced supra note 12.
82 See § 1512(c); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1102, 116 Stat.
745, 807; Hasnas, supra note 28, at 193.
83 See Hasnas, supra note 28, at 193;Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Federal Criminal "Code"Is a
Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as Case Study, 96J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 685 (2006) ("It
added a new omnibus provision, § 1512(c) (2), which mimics in major part § 1503's omni-
bus clause but is applicable in contexts outside of the judicial proceedings that § 1503
protects, such as in proceedings before federal agencies and in congressional inquiries.").
84 See § 1512(c); Hasnas, supra note 28, at 193.
85 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 802(a), 116 Stat. 745, 800.
86 See § 1519 (Supp. IV 2004).
87 See Hasnas, supra note 28, at 194.
88 See § 1519; Hasnas, supra note 28, at 194.
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. . . contemplation of' an official proceeding.8 9 This appears to
demonstrate congressional intent to avoid a "pending proceeding"
requirement. 90
II
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE CASES AND THE
NEXUS REQUIREMENT
A. The Nexus Requirement and United States v. Aguilar
In July 1987, Michael Rudy Tham sought post-conviction relief
from a federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to set aside his em-
bezzlement conviction.9 1 Tham asked Edward Solomon and Abraham
Chalupowitz (Abe Chapman) to assist him by talking to a Northern
District of California judge not assigned to the case, Judge Robert
Aguilar.9 2 Solomon and Chapman met with Aguilar,9 3 and Aguilar
spoke with the assigned judge, Judge Stanley Weigel, about the
matter.
94
In addition to the embezzlement conviction, the FBI had identi-
fied Tham as a suspect in a labor racketeering investigation.9 5 Chief
District Judge Robert Peckham authorized the FBI to install a wiretap
on Tham's business phones, and the application included Chapman
as a potential interceptee.9 6 After the FBI informed Chief Judge
Peckham of the meetings between Chapman and Aguilar, the Chief
Judge advised Aguilar that Chapman might have criminal connections
because his name had appeared on the wiretap authorization. 9 7
Five months after learning of the wiretap authorization, Aguilar
noticed a man observing his home during a visit with Chapman.9 8
Aguilar informed his nephew of the home surveillance and the wire-
tapping of Chapman's phone with the intention that his nephew
would pass along the message to Chapman.99 Aguilar mistakenly be-
lieved that the wiretap stemmed from the original application, but
89 See § 1519; Hasnas, supra note 28, at 194.
90 See Hill, supra note 72, at 1539.
91 United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 595 (1995) (explaining that Tham was con-
victed of embezzling funds from the local affiliate of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters).
92 Id.
93 Id. at 595-96. Aguilar knew Chapman through a distant marriage relation and
knew Solomon through law school. Id. at 595.
94 Id. at 595-96.
95 Id. at 596.
96 Id. (observing that the FBI applied for the wiretap on April 20, 1987, the 30-day
wiretap expired on May 20, 1987, and ChiefJudge Peckham maintained the secrecy of the
wiretap following a showing of good cause).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
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Chief Judge Peckham had separately authorized another wiretap ap-
plication, beginning in October 1987.100
Eventually, a grand jury began investigating an alleged conspiracy
to influence Tham's habeas case.' 0 ' During the investigation, two FBI
agents questioned Aguilar,10 2 but he lied about his role in the Tham
case and his knowledge of the wiretap.10 3 The grand jury indicted
Aguilar, and a jury found him guilty of disclosing a wiretap, violating
18 U.S.C. § 2232(c), and endeavoring to obstruct the due administra-
tion of justice, violating 18 U.S.C. § 1503.104 A Ninth Circuit panel
affirmed the § 2232(c) conviction and reversed the § 1503 convic-
tion. 105 Later, the Ninth Circuit reversed both convictions on rehear-
ing en banc, 10 6 reasoning that Aguilar had not interfered with a
pending judicial proceeding under § 1503.107
On review, the Supreme Court considered whether the Omnibus
Clause of § 1503 may punish mere false statements to potential grand
jury witnesses.10 8 The Court examined10 9 its decision in Pettibone v.
United States,110 which held that "a person is not sufficiently charged
with obstructing or impeding the due administration of justice in a
court unless it appears that he knew or had notice that justice was
being administered in such court." ' The Aguilar Court proceeded
to note that courts of appeals cases had placed "metes and bounds" on
the broad "catchall provision." 112 The Court then held that a nexus
requirement applied to § 1503-that the "endeavor must have the
'natural and probable effect' of interfering with the due administra-
tion of justice."' 13 Therefore, if the "defendant lacks knowledge that
his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding, he lacks the
requisite intent to obstruct. 1 14
100 Id.
101 Id. at 596-97.
102 Id. at 597.
103 Id.
104 Id. Aguilar received a sentence of two concurrent six-month terms of imprison-
ment and a fine of $2,000. United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475, 1477 (9th Cir. 1994),
rev'd, 515 U.S. 593 (1995).
105 Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 597.
106 Id.; Aguilar, 21 F.3d at 1476-77.
107 Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 597.
108 Id. at 595.
109 See id. at 599.
110 148 U.S. 197 (1893).
111 Id. at 206. The Court in Pettibone reasoned that a person lacking knowledge of a
pending proceeding necessarily cannot have the evil intent to obstruct. Id. at 206-07.
112 See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599.
' 13 Id. (quoting United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 695 (10th Cir. 1993)); United States
v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1990).
114 Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599. The Court declined to address Aguilar's various other
arguments on the basis that the "'nexus' requirement developed in the decisions of the
Courts of Appeals is a correct construction of § 1503." Id. at 600.
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B. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States
Aggressive accounting practices and rapid growth accompanied
Enron Corporation's shift in business focus from natural gas to en-
ergy.' 5 At the time, Enron entrusted Arthur Andersen LLP with the
responsibility of auditing Enron's public financial statements.1 6 En-
ron's declining financial performance began in 2000 and continued
through 2001.117 Jeffrey Skilling, Enron's Chief Executive Officer
(CEO), resigned suddenly in August 2001, and Enron reappointed
Kenneth Lay as his successor."18 Soon after, a senior Enron account-
ant informed Lay and Arthur Andersen partner Michael Odom of the
potential accounting scandals looming over Enron.' 1 9
On August 28, 2001, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) opened an informal investigation into Enron's alleged impro-
prieties. 120 Arthur Andersen reacted by forming an Enron "crisis-re-
sponse" team, which included in-house counsel Nancy Temple, and
retained outside counsel for any potential Enron-related litigation.' 2 1
Temple's notes from an in-house counsel meeting indicated that
"'some SEC investigation' [was] 'highly probable."' 1 22
In October 2001, Odom spoke at a general training meeting and
urged all employees to comply with Arthur Andersen's document re-
tention policy.' 23 Meanwhile, Temple designated the type of poten-
tial claim for the Enron matter as "Professional Practice-
Government/Regulatory Inv[estigation]"' 124 and e-mailed Odom to
suggest that he remind the crisis-response team of the document re-
tention policy.' 25
After Enron announced its third quarter results in October 2001,
the SEC notified the company that it had commenced an informal
investigation in August.' 26 The SEC's letter also requested "certain
115 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698 (2005).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 699. Arthur Andersen also became embattled in its own right. In June 2001,
the firm executed a settlement agreement with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) which carried a large fine. In addition, the SEC also censured the firm and en-
joined it from committing further securities violations. Then, inJuly 2001, the SEC named
a lead audit partner in an amended complaint alleging improprieties by Sunbeam Corpo-
ration. Id. at 699 n.2.
118 Id. at 699.
119 Id.
120 Id. (noting that the informal investigation followed a Wall Street Journal article
suggesting improprieties at Enron).
121 Id.
122 Id. (citation omitted).
123 Id. at 699-700.
124 Id. at 700.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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information and documents."127 On October 19, Enron forwarded a
copy of the letter to Arthur Andersen. 28 The following day, Temple
instructed the crisis-response team to continue to follow the docu-
ment retention policy. 129 David Duncan, the leader of Arthur Ander-
sen's Enron crisis-response team, 13 0 reminded certain Arthur
Andersen partners of the document retention policy following Enron
CEO Kenneth Lay's refusal to answer analysts' questions due to "po-
tential lawsuits, as well as the SEC inquiry."' 3' Duncan later distrib-
uted the policy at a crisis-response team meeting. 32
On October 26, an unnamed Arthur Andersen partner distrib-
uted a New York Times article discussing the SEC's Enron investiga-
tion.' 33 The partner commented via e-mail that "the problems are just
beginning and [Arthur Andersen] will be in the cross hairs."' 3 4 Days
later, on October 30, the SEC began a formal investigation and re-
quested accounting documents from Enron.' 35
On November 8, the SEC served Enron and Arthur Andersen
with subpoenas to obtain records.1 36 The next day, Duncan's secre-
tary distributed an e-mail stating, "Per Dave-No more shredding....
We have been officially served for our documents.'137 Less than a
month later, Enron filed for bankruptcy. 138 Arthur Andersen later
fired Duncan, who pleaded guilty to witness tampering. 139
The indictment against Arthur Andersen in March 2002-charg-
ing one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2) (A) and (B)-al-
leged that the petitioner "'did knowingly, intentionally and corruptly
persuade . . . other persons, to wit: [Arthur Andersen] employees,
with intent to cause' them to withhold documents from, and alter doc-
uments for use in, 'official proceedings, namely: regulatory and crimi-
nal proceedings and investigations. '''14 The jury returned a guilty
verdict. 14' The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court
properly instructed the jury on the meaning of "corruptly persuades"
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 701.
130 See id. at 698-99.
131 Id. at 698-99, 701.
132 Id. at 701.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 702.
137 Id. (omission in original).
8 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. (omission in original).
141 Id,
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and "official proceeding" and that the jury did not need to find any
consciousness of wrongdoing. 142
On review, the Supreme Court analyzed what it means to "'know-
ingly . . corruptly persuad[e]' another person 'with intent to . . .
cause' that person to 'withhold' documents from, or 'alter' docu-
ments for use in, an 'official proceeding.' "143 The Court found that
"[] nly persons conscious of wrongdoing can ... 'knowingly .. .cor-
ruptly persuad[e]. ' " 44 Therefore, the Court held that the 'jury in-
structions at issue ... failed to convey the requisite consciousness of
wrongdoing. 1
4 5
Although the Court ostensibly limited its holding to the district
court's error in instructing the jury on the meaning of "knowingly...
corruptly persuade," the Court proceeded to discuss the lack of any
nexus requirement in the instructions.' 46 The Court noted that the
instructions "led the jury to believe that it did not have to find any
nexus between the 'persua[sion]' to destroy documents and any par-
ticular proceeding.' 47 The Court stated that a "'knowingly ... cor-
rup[t] persuade[r]' cannot be someone who persuades others to
shred documents under a document retention policy when he does
not have in contemplation any particular official proceeding in which
those documents might be material."1 48 The Court reached this con-
clusion despite the language in the current version of § 1512(f) (1)
142 Id.
'43 Id. at 703 (alteration in original) (omission in original).
144 Id. at 706 (second alteration in original) (second omission in original).
145 Id.
146 See id. at 707-08. The district court charged the jury, in part:
[T]o determine whether Andersen corruptly persuaded "another person,"
an employee or partner of Andersen is considered "another person." To
"persuade" is to engage in any non-coercive attempt to induce another per-
son to engage in certain conduct. The word "corruptly" means having an
improper purpose. An improper purpose, for this case, is an intent to sub-
vert, undermine, or impede the fact-finding ability of an official proceed-
ing. In order to establish this corrupt persuasion element, the government
must prove that the agent of Andersen who engaged in the persuasion, not
the other person persuaded, possessed the improper purpose. The im-
proper purpose need not be the sole motivation for the defendant's con-
duct so long as the defendant acted, at least in part, with that improper
purpose.
Thus, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that an agent, such as a
partner, of Andersen acting within the scope of his or her employment,
induced or attempted to induce another employee or partner of the firm
or some other person to withhold, alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an
object, and that the agent did so with the intent, at least in part, to subvert,
undermine, or impede the fact-finding ability of an official proceeding,
then you may find that Andersen committed [an element of the charged
offense.]
Court's Instructions to the Jury, Arthur Andersen LLP, Cr. No. H-02-121, reprinted in
O'Sullivan, supra note 83, at 694-95 (alterations in original).
147 Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 707 (alteration in original).
148 Id. at 708 (alterations in original) (omission in original).
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providing that an official proceeding "need not be pending or about
to be instituted at the time of the offense" for prosecution under
§ 1512.149
The Court's nexus discussion was not strictly a part of its holding,
but the Court clearly sought to require some sort of nexus in witness
tampering cases. The specific nature of the nexus requirement, how-
ever, remains less clear. The Court could mean (1) that nexus re-
quires "knowledge of a pending proceeding," (2) that nexus requires
knowledge of a nexus, or (3) that the allegedly obstructive act must
have the "'natural and probable effect' of interfering with the due
administration of justice.' 150
C. Post-Arthur Andersen Nexus Requirement Cases
1. United States v. Ronda
Seven former police officers were convicted in a U.S. District
Court of conspiracy to obstruct justice, and six were convicted of ob-
struction ofjustice.151 On appeal, the officers argued that the Court's
decision in Arthur Andersen with respect to § 1512(b) (2) applied with
equal force to their convictions under § 1512(b) (3).152 The Eleventh
Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed their convictions and
sentences, 153 reasoning that although Arthur Andersen required that
"the acts of obstruction relate to 'an official proceeding,"'
§ 1512(b) (3) makes no mention of "an official proceeding."'154
2. United States v. Byrne
A federal district court jury convicted Harry Byrne, a former po-
lice sergeant, of one count of deprivation of constitutional rights and
four counts of witness tampering. 55 The First Circuit affirmed
Byrne's convictions but vacated his sentence.1 56 On appeal, Byrne
challenged the sufficiency of evidence to support his convictions
under Arthur Andersen.' 57 The First Circuit noted that the Court in
Arthur Andersen "did not elaborate on the particularity required by the
nexus requirement in subsection (b) (2)."158 Accordingly, the First
149 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1) (Supp. IV 2004); O'Sullivan, supra note 83, at 707.
150 United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995) (quoting United States v. Wood,
6 F.3d 692, 695 (10th Cir. 1993)).
151 See United States v. Ronda, 455 F.3d 1273, 1276 (11th Cir. 2006). Two of the de-
fendants were also convicted of perjury. See id.
152 Id. at 1288.
153 Id. at 1276, 1288.
154 Id. at 1288 (citing United States v. Byrne, 435 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2006)).
155 Byrne, 435 F.3d at 17-18.
156 Id. at 18.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 25.
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Circuit declined to "resolve the exact contours of any nexus require-
ment in subsection (b) (3)," opting instead to "defer any final judg-
ment for a future case that requires resolution of that issue."'159
3. United States v. Quattrone
Ajury found Frank Quattrone guilty of corruptly endeavoring to
obstruct a grand jury proceeding, corruptly endeavoring to obstruct
an SEC investigation, and witness tampering. 160 On review, the Sec-
ond Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded for retrial,161 con-
cluding that the district court's § 1512(b) jury instruction was
erroneous because it "told the jury that it need not find any nexus
between Quattrone's actions and the pending investigations. '162 The
Second Circuit noted, however, that the "question of whether the
nexus requirement applies in the same way to section 1512(b) as it
does to sections 1503 and 1505 is not relevant to resolution of this
appeal." 63
4. United States v. Vampire Nation
Ajury convicted Frederick Banks on counts of mail fraud, crimi-
nal copyright infringement, uttering and possessing counterfeit or
forged securities, and witness tampering. 164 The Third Circuit af-
firmed Banks's convictions and sentence in full. 165 Banks argued that
the district court improperly instructed the jury on the Arthur Andersen
requirement of "a nexus between the persuasion Banks allegedly di-
rected at [another person] and a particular proceeding."1 6 6 The
Third Circuit agreed with Banks that "a prosecution under
[§ 1512(b)(2)] cannot succeed if the Government fails to show a
,nexus between the "persuasion" to [impede] and any particular pro-
ceeding.' ,,167 The Third Circuit held, however, that the jury instruc-
tions exhibited no plain error in light of Arthur Andersen 68 because
the district court instructed the jury "that Banks could be found guilty
of witness tampering only if he acted with the specific intent to induce
[another person] to withhold evidence from an official
proceeding."'169
159 Id.
160 United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 161 (2d Cir. 2006).
161 Id.
162 Id. at 180-81.
163 Id. at 176 n.22.
164 United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 192 (3d Cir. 2006).
165 Id.
166 Id. at 204.
167 Id. at 205 (second alteration in original).
168 Id. at 205-06.
169 Id. at 205.
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5. United States v. Darif
Ajury found Anouar Darif guilty of marriage fraud, conspiracy to
commit marriage fraud, and witness tampering under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(b)(1). 7 0 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction on all
three counts. 1 7 1 Darif argued that the district court's failure to in-
struct the jury as to the definition of "corruptly persuade" constituted
reversible error.17 2 The Seventh Circuit noted the Supreme Court's
holding in Arthur Andersen that the witness tampering statute "requires
proof of a nexus between the corrupt persuasion and a particular pro-
ceeding. ' 173 Consequently, the Seventh Circuit found the jury instruc-
tions at issue sufficient because they made "clear to the jury that the
witness tampering charge was related to 'a particular proceeding.' "174
6. United States v. Starks
At trial, ajury convicted Pernell Starks of obstructing an investiga-
tion by destroying an affidavit but found him not guilty of assaulting a
federal agent.1 75 On appeal, Starks brought a multiplicity challenge,
claiming that both the assault and obstruction of justice counts
charged the same criminal conduct.1 76 Starks acknowledged Arthur
Andersen's requirement of a nexus between the corrupt act and the
government proceeding but argued that his actions did not involve
corruption, so that only the physical obstruction aspect of his conduct
remained.177 Starks reasoned that the physical obstruction equated to
an assault against a federal officer, and thus, the obstruction charge
was multiplicitous. 178 In rejecting Starks's argument, the Seventh Cir-
cuit implicitly acknowledged that Arthur Andersen would indeed re-
quire a nexus in appropriate cases. 179
170 United States v. Darif, 446 F.3d 701, 703 (7th Cir. 2006).
171 Id.
172 Id. at 711.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 712.
175 United States v. Starks, 472 F.3d 466, 467-68 (7th Cir. 2006).
176 Id. at 468.
177 See id. at 470.
178 See id.
179 See id. at 469-70 ("There was no allegation that Starks tried to corruptly persuade a
third party to destroy the affidavit and therefore [the] Arthur Andersen nexus requirement
is not relevant to this case." (emphasis added)).
419
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
III
ANALYSIS
A. Defining "Nexus"
1. Generally
Much of the confusion surrounding the Arthur Andersen opinion
stems from the issue of defining "nexus." Presumably, "nexus" might
assume a different meaning in various contexts. For example, a nexus
requirement under a federal drug statute' 80 might differ from a nexus
requirement in an obstruction of justice statute. 181 Within the ob-
struction statutes-generally understood to comprise §§ 1501-
1520' 82-one would reasonably expect a consistent definition of the
term. Because the named sections proscribe the same general type of
conduct-interfering with some type of adjudication-the same defi-
nition of "nexus" should apply consistently throughout these sections.
In United States v. Aguilar, the Court provided a clear definition of
"nexus" as applied to § 1503,' 3 reasoning that the defendant's action
"must be with an intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceed-
ings."' 8 4 The Court further explained that "the act must have a rela-
tionship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceedings."' 85
Finally, the Court defined "nexus" as requiring that the "endeavor...
have the 'natural and probable effect' of interfering with the due ad-
ministration of justice."' 8 6
Aguilar thus makes clear that "nexus" requires more than mere
knowledge of a pending proceeding.'87 The nexus requirement
might easily be confused with the "knowledge of a pending proceed-
ing" requirement because the nexus requirement necessarily implies
knowledge of a pending proceeding. Indeed, it would seem nearly
impossible for a defendant's act to have the natural and probable ef-
180 See, e.g., United States v. Pryor, 75 F. App'x 157, 160 (4th Cir. 2003) (concluding
that the district court did not err in applying enhanced federal drug sentencing provisions
given that evidence demonstrated a temporal nexus between the defendant's prior convic-
tions and the scope of his involvement in the conspiracy).
181 See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995) (defining the Omnibus
Clause nexus element to require that "the endeavor .. .have the 'natural and probable
effect' of interfering with the due administration of justice" (quoting United States v.
Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 695 (10th Cir. 1993))).
182 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1520 (2000 & Supp. tV 2004); supra note 8 and accompany-
ing text.
183 See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. (quoting United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 695 (10th Cir. 1993)).
187 See id. (discussing the knowledge element as requiring that "a person is not suffi-
ciently charged with obstructing or impeding the due administration ofjustice in a court
unless it appears that he knew or had notice that justice was being administered in such
court" (quoting Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 206 (1893))).
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fect of interfering with the due administration of justice if the defen-
dant did not, in some way, contemplate a pending proceeding. The
key distinction, then, may very well amount to the difference between
"contemplation" and "knowledge" of a pending proceeding. A defen-
dant may satisfy the nexus requirement merely by contemplating a
pending proceeding and acting in a way that would have the natural
and probable effect of interfering with that proceeding, without ever
having knowledge that the pending proceeding actually existed. Re-
gardless, the Court makes clear that the nexus requirement and the
"knowledge of a pending proceeding" requirement are distinct ele-
ments.188 Commentators agree with the Court that these two ele-
ments, the nexus requirement and the knowledge requirement, limit
the obstruction ofjustice statutes. 89
2. Arthur Andersen and § 1512(b)
The more difficult task is to determine what the Arthur Andersen
Court intended when it required some "type of nexus" in cases arising
under § 1512(b). 190 The Court provided its reasoning for the nexus
requirement without ever precisely defining what it was requiring. 191
In the absence of further guidance, a reader would likely assume that
the Court viewed the nexus requirement in Arthur Andersen in the
same manner that it defined the concept in Aguilar.
Though it left no clear explanation, the Arthur Andersen Court did
leave hints as to its intent. First, it implied that § 1512(b) required
some level of foreseeability with respect to an official proceeding. 19 2
Foreseeability, however, pertains to the "knowledge of a pending pro-
ceeding," not the nexus, requirement. A defendant who may foresee
a pending proceeding may not necessarily realize that a given act will
have the natural and probable effect of interfering with that proceed-
ing. The nexus requirement, as the Court in Aguilar outlined, implies
some level of materiality that is missing from mere foreseeability.
Thus, "foreseeability" directly implicates nothing more than the
knowledge requirement. 193
188 See id.
189 See, e.g., Hill, supra note 72, at 1524, 1535-48. Hill explains that the courts have
used two requirements "to limit the reach of pre-Sarbanes-Oxley obstruction statutes: the
'nexus' requirement and the requirement that defendants have knowledge of the particu-
lar proceeding obstructed by their actions." Id. at 1524.
190 See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 707 (2005) ("In resisting
any type of nexus element, the Government [contends] . (emphasis added)).
191 See id. at 707-08.
192 See id. ("It is... one thing to say that a proceeding 'need not be pending or about
to be instituted at the time of the offense,' and quite another to say a proceeding need not
even be foreseen.").
193 But cf United States v. Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269, 1273-75 (4th Cir. 1979). The
court in Neiswender held that the government can satisfy the knowledge requirement with
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Second, the Court's Arthur Andersen opinion indicates that it in-
tended the nexus requirement to apply in the same manner as it did
in Aguilar. The Court stated that a "'knowingly . . . corrupt[t] per-
suade[r]' cannot be someone who persuades others to shred docu-
ments under a document retention policy when he does not have in
contemplation any particular official proceeding in which those docu-
ments might be material."'9 4 The Court's use of "contemplate" is espe-
cially important when read in conjunction with "material.' 95 This
language implies that when the Court talks about the nexus require-
ment, it is not talking about knowledge of a pending proceeding but
rather contemplation of a particular proceeding that the acts of the de-
fendant might materially affect.1 96 This strongly suggests that the
Court in Arthur Andersen was applying the Aguilar nexus requirement.
Unfortunately, the Court never explicitly announced that it was
applying the Aguilar nexus requirement to § 1512(b)-as opposed to
some other type of nexus-despite devoting the penultimate para-
graph of the opinion to a discussion of Aguilar.t9 7 The Court did,
however, state that it "faced a similar situation in Aguilar," implying
application of the nexus requirement to § 1512(b) in the same man-
ner as to § 1503.198 Furthermore, after briefly restating the facts of
Aguilar, the Court in Arthur Andersen repeated its holding, requiring "a
'nexus' between the obstructive act and the proceeding."'199 The
Court's quotation of the term "nexus" in the context of its § 1512(b)
discussion 200 tends to convey a clear intention to import the term-
with the same meaning-from Aguilar and apply it to § 1512(b). In-
deed, the Court's conclusion of its nexus discussion essentially consti-
tutes acceptance of the Aguilar nexus requirement precedent.20 1
the lesser showing of "notice" or "the reasonable foreseeability of the natural and probable
consequences of one's acts." Id. at 1273 (emphasis added).
The Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have followed the approach in Neis-
wender. See United States v. Atkin, 107 F.3d 1213, 1219 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1314 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386,
1393-96 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Buffalano, 727 F.2d 50, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1984).
194 Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 708 (emphasis added) (alternations in original) (omis-
sion in original).
195 "Material" is defined as being of "such a nature that knowledge of the item would
affect a person's decision-making; significant; essential." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 998 (8th
ed. 2004).
196 Compare the language in Aguilar that "if the defendant lacks knowledge that his
actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding, he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct."
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995).
197 See Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 708.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 See id.
201 See id.
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B. The Nexus Requirement and § 1512(c)
The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 greatly augmented
the government's ability to prosecute subsequent witness tampering
and document destruction cases.2" 2 Some argued that §§ 1512(c) and
1519 would largely displace § 1512(b) as the tools for prosecuting ob-
structive document destruction. 20 3 Thus, one commentator, John
Hasnas, brushed aside Arthur Andersen as a "meaningless," albeit "im-
portant," decision.204 Despite this apparent contradiction, Hasnas is
clearly correct that some document destruction prosecutions will util-
ize § 1512(c) or § 1519, notwithstanding prosecutors' natural ten-
dency to prefer trusted, preexisting statutes. It does not follow,
however, that the reasoning behind Arthur Andersen does not pertain
to these newer statutes as well.
In many respects, § 1512(c) (2) appears destined to become the
new Omnibus Clause.20 5 According to President George W. Bush, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act arose from a need to "adopt[ ] tough new provi-
sions to deter and punish corporate and accounting fraud and corrup-
tion, ensure justice for wrongdoers, and protect the interests of
workers and shareholders. '" 20 6 Unlike § 1512(b), § 1512(c) (2) is in-
transitive-it applies to obstructive activity that the defendant directly
performs, rather than obstructive activity that the defendant somehow
encourages. 207  To the extent that § 1512(c) (2) overlaps with
§ 1503,208 § 1512(c)(2)'s requirement that there be obstruction of an
"official proceeding" is broader and more widely applicable than
§ 1503, which applies only to obstruction of a pending 'judicial pro-
ceeding." Furthermore, and very importantly, § 1512(f) states that
"[flor the purposes of this section[,] an official proceeding need not
202 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 802 (a), 1102, 116 Stat. 745,
800, 807 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c), 1519 (2000)).
203 See, e.g., Hasnas, supra note 28, at 193-94; see also O'Sullivan, supra note 83, at
654-55 (arguing that prosecutors leverage "substantially greater bargaining power vis-[;l]-
vis the defense" by exploiting the choices available to them to prosecute new offenses that
are essentially "more specialized models of old statutes").
204 See Hasnas, supra note 28, at 187.
205 See O'Sullivan, supra note 83, at 685 ("[Sarbanes-Oxley] added a new omnibus pro-
vision, § 1512(c) (2), which mimics in major part § 1503's omnibus clause but is applicable
in contexts outside of the judicial proceedings that § 1503 protects, such as in proceedings
before federal agencies and in congressional inquiries.").
206 Statement on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (July 30, 2002), 38 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1286, 1286 (Aug. 5, 2002), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
wcomp/v38no31.html.
207 See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)-(c) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); O'Sullivan, supra note 83, at
712.
208 Sections 1503 and 1512(c) (2) both involve instances in which the defendant acted
"corruptly" to "influence." See O'Sullivan, supra note 83, at 712. But see id. at 713 (pointing
out that § 1503 requires an "endeavor," while § 1512 applies only to "attempts," a slightly
more demanding standard).
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be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense. 2 °9
Thus, unlike § 1503, § 1512(c) (2) does not require that the defen-
dant know of a pending proceeding.
In determining the attractiveness of prosecuting under
§ 1512(c) (2), an important issue is the extent to which the nexus re-
quirement applies. Given the Aguilar Court's reasoning for applying a
nexus requirement to § 1503 and the Arthur Andersen Court's reason-
ing for applying the nexus requirement to § 1512(b), the Court would
likely apply the same requirement to § 1512(c) (2). Thus, assuming
the nexus requirement will apply, the intransitive nature of
§ 1512(c) (2) is the only facially obvious difference between the statu-
tory text of §§ 1512(c) (2) and 1512(b).2 1 0
In Aguilar, the Court discussed justice Scalia's dissent, analogizing
his position to finding that a person violated § 1503
if he knew of a pending investigation and lied to his wife about his
whereabouts at the time of the crime, thinking that an FBI agent
might decide to interview her and that she might in turn be influ-
enced in her statement to the agent by her husband's false account
of his whereabouts.211
The majority concluded its § 1503 discussion by asserting that in such
a hypothetical, "[t]he intent to obstruct justice is indeed present, but
the man's culpability is a good deal less clear from the statute than
[the Court] usually require [s] in order to impose criminal liability."212
Likewise, the Court in Arthur Andersen concluded its discussion of the
nexus requirement and § 1512(b) by simply repeating its holding in
Aguilar.213
The impetus for the Aguilar Court's addition of the nexus re-
quirement to § 1503 was clearly based on its view of the level of culpa-
bility required by that provision, and the Arthur Andersen Court
deferred its nexus discussion to its holding in Aguilar.214 In light of
the Court's concern for culpability in applying the nexus requirement
to § 1503, as well as the extensive similarities between §§ 1503 and
1512(c) (2), the reasoning in Aguilar also demands application of the
nexus requirement to § 1512(c) (2). Moreover, Arthur Andersen
demonstrated that the Court remains willing to defer to precedent
when considering whether to apply the nexus requirement to obstruc-
209 § 1512(f) (1) (Supp. IV 2004); O'Sullivan, supra note 83, at 712 (explaining that the
official proceeding need not be pending for purposes of § 1512 prosecutions).
210 See id. § 1512(b)-(c) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
211 United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 602 (1995).
212 Id.
213 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005).
214 See id.
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tion ofjustice cases, 215 making the case for applying a nexus require-
ment to § 1512(c) (2) even stronger.
The option to use either § 1503 or § 1512(c) (2) significantly im-
pacts prosecutorial bargaining power. 216 The maximum penalty
under § 1503 is ten years' imprisonment,217 while the maximum pen-
alty under § 1512(c) is twenty years. 218 In addition, § 1512(c) (2) over-
laps with § 1505's application to congressional and agency
investigations. 21 9 Under § 1505, the maximum penalty is a mere five-
year term of imprisonment.220 Although this prosecutorial leverage
presents little constitutional concern, defendants may, in close cases,
choose to negotiate a plea agreement rather than pursue trial. 221 The
potential limit on § 1512(c) (2) prosecutions offered by a nexus re-
quirement remains attractive to defendants given the advantages that
a choice among statutes currently affords the prosecution.
C. The Nexus Requirement and § 1519
Sarbanes-Oxley significantly enhanced the prosecutorial arsenal
for document destruction with the addition of § 1519.222 Like
§ 1512(c), § 1519 is intransitive, affecting obstructive activity that the
defendant directly performs.223 Moreover, it also appears to extend to
executive branch or agency investigations, which allows broad
prosecutorial reach. 224 Significantly, § 1519 omits the mental state el-
ement "corruptly," merely requiring that one "knowingly" destroy doc-
uments with the intent to impede a federal investigation. 225
Some commentators have downplayed the significance of § 1519
by arguing that it does little to proscribe conduct that earlier statutes
had not already criminalized. 226 This view stems from the claim that
§ 1519 fails to meaningfully extend the broad reach that some courts
had given obstruction of justice statutes prior to Sarbanes-Oxley. 2 27
One commentator observed the sentiments of others that "criminal
215 See id.
216 See O'Sullivan, supra note 83, at 713.
217 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000) (assuming that the underlying crime involves no killing or
other special circumstance).
218 Id. §§ 1503, 1512(c).
219 See id. §§ 1505, 1512(c) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); O'Sullivan, supra note 83, at 713.
220 § 1505.
221 See O'Sullivan, supra note 83, at 713.
222 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 802(a), 116 Stat. 745, 800
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2000)); Hasnas, supra note 28, at 194.
223 See § 1519 (Supp. IV 2004).
224 See id.
225 See id.
226 See Hill, supra note 72, at 1522 (citing Michael A. Perino, Enron's Legislative After-
math: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN's L.
REv. 671, 680 (2002)).
227 See id.
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practitioners view the new provisions and get-tough rhetoric [of
Sarbanes-Oxley] as little more than sound and fury signifying
nothing."228
Dana Hill adopts a different approach by arguing that § 1519
"can play a new and significant role in prohibiting anticipatory ob-
struction of justice-document destruction by individuals who are
savvy enough to pre-empt an investigation by acting before they have
knowledge about the specific proceeding that may demand the docu-
ments.."229 In other words, Hill argues that Congress intended and, in
fact, designed § 1519 to generate an entirely new area of obstruction
ofjustice law-that of anticipatory obstruction. 230 Under this theory,
courts could find § 1519 liability in cases in which the defendant "in-
tentionally destroys documents with only a general contemplation of
the obstructed proceedings."2 3 1 As Hill points out, this would elimi-
nate the "knowledge of a specific proceeding" requirement from
§ 1519 cases. 23 2
Hill augments his interpretation of § 1519 by arguing that this
position "gives distinct meaning to the unique language of § 1519,
which imposes liability on those who act 'in relation to or contempla-
tion of' a federal investigation or matter. ' 233 To the extent that courts
may read the "knowledge of a pending proceeding" requirement out
of § 1519, the language to which Hill refers still lends itself to applica-
tion of the nexus requirement. In addition, Hill expresses disbelief at
the possibility of redundancy between § 1519 and pre-Sarbanes-Oxley
obstruction of justice statutes. 234 Assuming that a nonredundant
criminal code is desirable, Hill's reading partially avoids redundancy
only with respect to the "knowledge of a pending proceeding" re-
quirement 235 while leaving the threat of redundancy with respect to
the nexus requirement. Applying the nexus requirement to § 1519
228 Id. at 1522-23 (alteration in original) (quoting John J. Falvey Jr. & Matthew A.
Wolfman, The Criminal Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley: A Tale of Sound and Fury?, WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME REP., Oct. 2002, at 1, 2).
229 Id. at 1523 (citing W. Warren Hamel et al., They Got Tougher: New Criminal Penalties
for Fraud and Obstruction Affect All Companies, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 7, 2002, at 34; Abbe David
Lowell & Kathryn C. Arnold, Corporate Crime After 2000: A New Law Enforcement Challenge or
D6d Vu?, 40 Asi. CRIM. L. REv. 219, 225 (2003)).
230 Id. at 1565.
231 Id.
232 See id.; see also id. 1565 n.295 (discussing Justice Scalia's Aguilar dissent, in which he
posited that awareness of a pending proceeding must only be shown insofar as it relates to
the actor's intent).
233 Id. at 1565 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Supp. IV 2004)).
234 See id.
235 There is still a slight overlap with respect to the knowledge requirement because
knowledge of a pending proceeding would certainly satisfy Hill's "general contemplation"
requirement.
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helps to remedy the concern for jury confusion2 36 that has troubled
some commentators. Requiring that the obstruction exhibit the "'nat-
ural and probable effect' of interfering with the due administration of
justice"23 7 helps clarify the meaning of "in relation to or contempla-
tion of."2 38 A nexus requirement would also help to alleviate concern
that courts might "reward perpetrators of business crimes for their
prescience by shifting the focus from the actor's mental state regarding
the proceeding to the actor's mental state regarding the obstruction.'" 23 9
The nexus keeps the focus on both the actor's mental state regarding
the proceeding and the actor's mental state regarding the obstruction
by demanding that the obstruction have the natural and probable ef-
fect of interfering with the proceeding.
Although some arguments for eliminating the "knowledge of a
pending proceeding" requirement from § 1519 have merit, they do
not hold true for the nexus requirement. Following the Arthur Ander-
sen trial verdict, then-Assistant United States Attorney Andrew Weiss-
mann stated, "When you expect the police, don't destroy evidence."'24°
This statement is simply too broad. One defense to prosecution
under § 1519 involves consistent application and enforcement of a re-
tention policy, which tends to demonstrate a lack of the requisite spe-
cific intent to obstruct justice. 241 As Hill acknowledges, the statute
explicitly limits itself by using "contemplation" as a separate mental
state regarding the obstructed proceeding. 242 The nexus requirement
is not only consistent with this added language but is desirable as a
limitation on the expansive reading that some commentators and
courts would like to afford § 1519. In Aguilar, the Court appealed to
culpability when it applied the nexus requirement to § 1503,243 and
the Court in Arthur Andersen followed that precedent by applying the
nexus requirement to § 1512(b). 244 Courts should follow the same
course with respect to § 1519.
236 Cf Hill, supra note 72, at 1565-66 (offering "an alternative to the confusing jury
instructions under § 1512 which instruct jurors that they do not need to find that a pro-
ceeding was in progress when the obstructive act took place, but that they do need to find
an 'intent to obstruct ... an official proceeding'" (omission in original)).
237 United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995) (quoting United States v. Wood,
6 F.3d 692, 695 (10th Cir. 1993)).
238 § 1519.
239 Hill, supra note 72, at 1566 (discussing jury confusion regarding the "knowledge of
a pending proceeding" requirement).
240 Id.
241 See id. Of course, this does not constitute a defense under the actual language of
the statute but may act to prevent successful prosecution of the crime.
242 See § 1519; Hill, supra note 72, at 1567.
243 See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 602 (1995).
244 See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005).
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D. Practical and Constitutional Considerations
1. Document Retention Policies After Arthur Andersen
Business entities develop document retention policies for various
business and legal reasons, resulting in both economic and legal pro-
tection. 245 The policy at issue in Arthur Andersen mandated that em-
ployees only retain final work papers supporting client audits and
required destruction of drafts, notes, and memos. 2 46 The same policy
also required employees to retain all documents related to any litiga-
tion anticipated by Arthur Andersen. 24
7
To avoid inundation beneath ever-growing piles of documents,
business organizations inevitably look to document retention policies
as a way of managing space limitations and storage costs.2 48 Business
entities should create such policies prior to engaging in document
destruction,249 and these policies should clearly describe which docu-
ments to retain, which documents to destroy, and the appropriate
time frame for destruction. 250
Not only do companies, firms, and partnerships purge useless
documents, but they also utilize document retention policies to keep
"unnecessarily damaging documents from coming to light."'251 Simply
put, document retention policies reduce legal exposure. Neverthe-
less, all document retention policies "should clearly state the categori-
zation of documents and electronic files, what documents must be
preserved, the retention period for each category, the document de-
struction procedures, and what to do when litigation or an investiga-
tion commences."252
Because a document retention policy may work against a com-
pany if employees violate it, strict compliance is essential. 253 To se-
cure strict employee compliance, management should inform all
245 See Christopher R. Chase, To Shred or Not to Shred: Document Retention Policies and
Federal Obstruction of Justice Statutes, 8 FoRDH-" J. CORP. & FIN. L. 721, 721 (2003).
246 See id. at 723.
247 See id.
248 See id. at 724.
249 See id. In addition, organizations should adopt document retention policies
outside the context of current litigation. See Lisa Shaheen, Required Recordkeeping Sets the
Record Straight, PEST CONTROL, Apr. 2001, at 27.
250 See Michael Orey, Document Shredding Shows Importance of Having a Policy on What Is
Preserved, WALL ST.J., Jan. 14, 2002, at A6 ("Without a policy, you're open to an allegation
that there was some nefarious purpose for destruction of documents." (quoting George
Terwilliger III, a white-collar defense attorney at White & Case LLP)); Saundra Torry,
Shredding: Decisions of Taste, Law and Common Sense, WASH. PosT, Mar. 14, 1994, at F7 ("You
don't destroy anything until you have a 'document retention policy' in place." (quoting
attorney Arthur Wineburg)).
251 Chase, supra note 245, at 725.
252 Id. at 725-26 (citing Robert M. Barker et al., Document Retention, INTERNAL AUDITOR,
Dec. 1996, at 50-51).
253 See id. at 726.
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employees of the policy and its procedures, 2 54 and should clarify that
the purpose of the policy is not to dishonestly destroy evidence. 255 To
be safe, once any legal proceeding is contemplated or initiated, busi-
ness entities should halt the normal operation of their document re-
tention policies and instruct employees to retain all documents
related to the proceeding. 25 6
The post-Arthur Andersen Sedona Guidelines-promulgated by
The Sedona Conference-provide additional guidance to business or-
ganizations. 257 The Sedona Guidelines consist of four basic guidelines
for business entities desiring to adopt a valid document retention
policy:
Guideline 1: An organization should have reasonable policies and
procedures for managing its information and records.
Guideline 2: An organization's information and records manage-
ment policies and procedures should be realistic, practical, and tai-
lored to the circumstances of the organization.
Guideline 3: An organization need not retain all electronic infor-
mation ever generated or received.
Guideline 4: An organization adopting an information and records
management policy should also develop procedures that address
the creation, identification, retention, retrieval, and ultimate dispo-
sition or destruction of information and records.2 58
The Sedona Guidelines also provide case law analysis and discussion
of secondary authorities to provide more detailed guidance for devel-
opment of document retention policies.
25 9
Most courts abstain from punishing document destruction pursu-
ant to a business organization's legitimate document retention pol-
icy.2 60 Still, the policies must be reasonable and purposeful-not
merely a pretense-for destroying evidence in contemplation of litiga-
tion.2 61 As Arthur Andersen made clear at the district court level, a doc-
ument retention policy will not immunize a business entity from
254 See id. at 726-27.
255 See Julian Joshua, European Union: Antitrust Compliance Programmes for Multinational
Companies, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Supplement: Competition and Antitrust 2001, at 65, 68.
256 See Chase, supra note 245, at 727.
257 See generally THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICE
GUIDELINES & COMMENTARY FOR MANAGING INFORMATION & RECORDS IN THE ELECTRONIC
AGE (Charles R. Ragan et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter SEDONA GUIDELINES].
258 Jonathan M. Redgrave et al., Looking Beyond Arthur Andersen: The Impact on Corpo-
rate Records and Information Management Policies and Practices, FED. LAW., Sept. 2005, at 32, 35
(citing SEDONA GUIDELINES, supra note 257).
259 See id.
260 See Chase, supra note 245, at 728 (citing Moore v. Gen. Motors Corp., 558 S.W.2d
720, 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) ("[W]e see no evidence of fraud or bad faith in a corporation
destroying records it is no longer required by law to keep and which are destroyed in
accord with its regular practices.")).
261 See id.
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sanctions.2 62 Moreover, document destruction in the absence of a
document retention policy may constitute bad faith on the part of the
business entity.26
3
It is especially important for organizations to follow develop-
ments in obstruction of justice laws. With a firm knowledge of the
developing laws, businesses can appropriately balance the competing
purposes of obstruction laws and document retention policies.2 64 De-
termining whether a nexus must exist between the alleged obstruction
and the pending proceeding is of great practical importance to a com-
pany seeking to establish a document retention policy.
2. Prosecutorial Discretion and Power
Federal prosecutors enjoy broad prosecutorial discretion, al-
lowing for far-reaching control over criminal cases. The power to
charge is perhaps the strongest example of the reach of prosecutorial
discretion.2 65 Prosecutors determine whether and how to charge a de-
fendant, as well as whether to offer a plea bargain and the ultimate
terms of such an agreement.2 66 Because trial presents a defendant
with the risk of additional convictions and an extended prison term
compared to most plea agreements, 2 67 plea bargaining resolves a ma-
jority of criminal cases. 2 68 Thus, prosecutorial control over the plea
bargaining process translates into direct control over the resolution of
the majority of criminal cases.269
Given this significant prosecutorial power, the potential for abuse
of discretion is high. Coercive pretrial tactics include intimidation of
262 See id. (citing Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988)
("[A] corporation cannot blindly destroy documents and expect to be shielded by a seem-
ingly innocuous document retention policy.")).
263 See id.
264 Chase argues that this balance can be achieved if a document retention policy is:
a) suspended when a corporation learns that litigation or an investigation
into the corporation is imminent; b) the corporation then reinstates the
policy as to irrelevant or unnecessary documents regarding the investiga-
tion or litigation proceedings; c) and is fully reinstated once the investiga-
tion or litigation proceedings are over, thereby making the process cost
effective while at the same time complying with the government and the
essence of fairness.
Id. at 756 (footnote omitted).
265 See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of
Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REv. 393, 408 (2001) [hereinafter Davis, The American Prosecutor] (dis-
cussing the important effect of the initial charging decision on the outcome of a criminal
case); AngelaJ. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FoDutHAM
L. REV. 13, 23-24 (1998) (same).
266 Davis, The American Prosecutor, supra note 265, at 408.
267 See id. at 409.
268 See Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Note, Should We Really "Ban" Plea Bargaining?: The Core
Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 753 (1998) (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES 29 (1992)).
269 See, e.g., Davis, The American Prosecutor, supra note 265, 408-09.
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witnesses, 2711 selective 2 7' and vindictive2 72 prosecution, and abuse of
the grand jury process.2 73 Examples of abusive prosecution trial tac-
tics include improper opening statements, 2 74 cross-examination,275
and closing arguments. 276 In addition, prosecutors may violate their
legal duty to reveal exculpatory evidence to the defense. 2 77
In addition to these tangible examples of prosecutorial miscon-
duct, a prosecutor's decision to bring charges without sufficient evi-
dence is both unethical and harmful.2 78 Despite these concerns,
prosecutors tend to "charge more and greater offenses than they can
prove beyond a reasonable doubt."279 And while defendants fre-
quently plead to reduced charges, even these lesser charges often ex-
ceed the scope of evidence available to the prosecutor.280 To make
270 Id. at 410 (citing United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 991 (1 lth Cir. 1997) (threat-
ening a witness with loss of immunity if he testified for the defense); United States v.
LaFuente, 54 F.3d 457, 459, 461 (8th Cir. 1995) (alleging that the government threatened
a witness with jail time if she spoke to the defense counsel or the press); United States v.
MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 475 (4th Cir. 1982) (threatening a witness's attorney with rei-
ndictment if the witness self-incriminated while testifying)).
271 Id. (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 459 (1996) (evaluating a selec-
tive prosecution claim supported by a "study" purporting to show that the government
failed to prosecute nonblack individuals for cocaine and crack offenses); United States v.
A1Jibori, 90 F.3d 22, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1996) (evaluating a selective prosecution claim stem-
ming from pattern similarity between defendant and a known terrorist, both of whom sepa-
rately entered the United States with fake Swedish passports); United States v. Cyprian, 23
F.3d 1189, 1195 (7th Cir. 1994) (claiming that the government singled out defendants
based on their religious faith)).
272 Id. (citing United States v. Holloway, 74 F.3d 249, 250-51 (11th Cir. 1996) (dis-
missing criminal charges brought by the prosecution pursuant to the defendant's deposi-
tion and in violation of a pre-existing immunity agreement); United States v. Dudden, 65
F.3d 1461, 1464-68, 1472 (9th Cir. 1995) (vacating the defendant's sentence where prose-
cutors breached an informal immunity agreement and indicted the defendant to force
cooperation in another investigation)).
273 Id. at 411 (citing United States v. Chen, 933 F.2d 793, 796-98 (9th Cir. 1991) (ex-
amining a "perjury trap" in which a prosecutor calls a witness for the primary purpose of
obtaining testimony to support a later prosecution of the witness for perjury); Barry v.
United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1318-21 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (involving alleged grand jury se-
crecy violations where a United States Attorney issued a press release disclosing matters
occurring before a federal grand jury); United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 884-85
(9th Cir. 1979) (upholding the dismissal of an indictment due to prosecutorial misconduct
in grand jury proceedings)).
274 Id.
275 Id. (citing United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1219, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1999)
(finding misconduct where the prosecutor had forced the defendant to call the United
States marshal a liar and impeached the defendant with inadmissible evidence)).
276 Id. (citing United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546, 551-53 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding
that the prosecutor's closing argument and witness bolstering necessitated a new trial)).
277 See id. at 411-12 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963) (determining
that withholding material exculpatory evidence violates "standards ofjustice" and fairness
to the accused)).
278 See id. at 413.
279 Id.
280 See id.
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matters worse, defendants face difficulty in availing themselves of dis-
covery procedures necessary to obtain judicial review of prosecutorial
misconduct, and courts rarely act to remedy abuses. 28'
Prosecutorial power and the potential for misconduct remain
equally troubling in the context of white collar investigations. 28 2 Pros-
ecutors yield tremendous leverage in the white collar arena-given
the potentially catastrophic effects of a mere indictment, many com-
panies opt to yield to prosecutorial authority and cooperate. 28 3 More-
over, under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, cooperation is a factor
that "mitigate [s] the ultimate punishment" of business entities. 28 4
The advantage that prosecutors hold in criminal cases-both white
collar and non-white-collar alike-is clear.
The broad and far-reaching power that federal prosecutors enjoy
in white collar criminal cases calls for additional limitations on white
collar statutes. As a general matter, corporate defendants often find
themselves in dire straits amidst investigation and prosecution. Be-
cause of the significant leverage that prosecutors possess-and the
grave consequences that may result-federal courts must clarify and
limit the language of obstruction of justice statutes. If nothing else,
limiting language in the form of a nexus requirement will clarify the
scope of criminal behavior. The risk of prosecutorial abuse is espe-
cially relevant given the concern for culpability that the Court dis-
cussed in Aguilar when introducing the nexus requirement to the
realm of obstruction ofjustice.285 With the risk of prosecutorial abuse
and the concern for culpability just as relevant throughout the ob-
struction of justice statutes, the trend toward a broadly applicable
nexus requirement should continue.
281 See id. at 414.
282 But see Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Ander-
sen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 114 (2006) ("On the criminal side of things,
resources are limited: prosecutors have other crimes besides corporate misconduct to pur-
sue, and white-collar investigations often take years of prosecutor and investigator time to
complete."); Peter J. Henning, Targeting Legal Advice, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 669, 671 (2005)
("The difficulty prosecutors face in prosecuting corporate misconduct and other types of
white-collar crimes is identifying the particular acts that violate the statute, and then amas-
sing sufficient proof of intent to establish that a crime has occurred.").
283 See George Ellard, Making the Silent Speak and the Informed Wary, 42 Am. CRIM. L. REv.
985, 987-88 (2005) ("[A]s the demise of the accounting firm Arthur Andersen demon-
strates, indictments can be lethal, even for venerable institutions. The 2002 indictment of
that company and its subsequent conviction for obstruction of justice caused the 90-year-
old entity to implode. Thus, the possibility of avoiding indictment creates a strong incen-
tive for business organizations to cooperate in government investigations.").
284 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL 468 (2004).
285 See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
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3. Constitutional Constraints and Canons of Construction
The Constitution can provide additional guidance as to whether
the Aguilar nexus requirement should apply to §§ 1512(b),
1512(c) (2), and 1519. Obstruction of justice statutes often survive
constitutional challenges by defendants claiming they lacked notice
that the law prohibited their actions. 28 6 Defendants have challenged
the obstruction statutes on various grounds, 2 7 including vagueness, 28
overbreadth, 289 and free expression under the First Amendment. 290
Obstruction of justice statutes have also survived Double Jeopardy
challenges,291 Fifth Amendment due process challenges, 292 and chal-
lenges that Congress overstepped its authority under the Necessary
and Proper Clause. 293 Given the history of unsuccessful constitutional
challenges to obstruction of justice statutes, defendants considering
such challenges to the nexus requirement should proceed with an un-
derstanding of the unlikelihood of success.
Criminal canons of construction serve as valuable tools for exam-
ining the application of the nexus requirement to obstruction of jus-
tice statutes from a constitutional perspective. Courts typically apply
canons of construction dealing with ambiguity only after examining
prior judicial decisions,294 legislative history,295 and underlying poli-
cies29 6 of the law.2 9 7 Although courts reserve the application of ca-
nons of construction until the completion of this hierarchical analysis,
286 See Hill, supra note 72, at 1569; see also Keith Palfin & Sandhya Prabhu, Obstruction of
Justice, 40 AM. GuM. L. REV. 873, 886-87, 900-01 (2003) (citing cases holding that the
§ 1503 Omnibus Clause is not unconstitutionally vague and noting that courts have upheld
§§ 1512 and 1513 against various constitutional challenges).
287 See Palfin & Prabhu, supra note 286, at 886-87, 900-01.
288 See, e.g., United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 91-92 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting argu-
ments of constitutional vagueness with respect to § 1512 despite the fact that the prosecu-
tion need not prove the defendant's mental state as to the federal nature of the
proceeding); United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1300 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 1996).
289 See, e.g., Shotts, 145 F.3d at 1300; Thompson, 76 F.3d at 452.
290 See, e.g., Thompson, 76 F.3d at 452; United States v. Velasquez, 772 F.2d 1348,
1356-58 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Wilson, 565 F. Supp. 1416, 1429-30 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
291 See, e.g., United States v. McLaughlin, 164 F.3d 1, 3, 7-12 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United
States v. Galvan, 949 F.2d 777, 780-82 (5th Cir. 1991).
292 See, e.g., Tyler, 281 F.3d at 93-94.
293 See, e.g., id. at 92-93.
294 SeeJohn Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes,
71 VA. L. REV. 189, 210 (1985) ("LJ]udicial administration of the rule belies any real con-
cern for fair warning. Pronouncements in ancient precedent are taken to have resolved
statutory ambiguity .... ).
295 See 3 NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 59:3, at 134
(6th ed. 2001) ("The rule of lenity should only be applied if after reviewing all sources of
legislative intent the statute still remains ambiguous.").
296 See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990).
297 See Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARv. L. REv. 2420, 2425 (2006).
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such canons still provide a useful tool by which to consider potentially
ambiguous statutory language.
At the head of the criminal canons of construction is the princi-
ple of legality. 298 The principle of legality "stands for the desirability
in principle of advance legislative specification of criminal miscon-
duct."299 The concerns of legality arise under the doctrines of vague-
ness and lenity.300 The vagueness doctrine acts as the "operational
arm of legality" and requires that a "crime definition be meaningfully
precise-or at least that it not be meaninglessly indefinite.130 1 Filling
in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley obstruction statutes with the nexus re-
quirement will help to ensure that the statutes do not reach an uncon-
stitutional level of vagueness.
Among the most common of the canons of construction is the
rule of lenity. The rule of lenity states that "penal statutes should be
strictly construed against the government.13 0 2 In interpreting the ob-
struction statutes in cases of sufficient ambiguity, the rule of lenity
may act as a tiebreaker and compel application of the nexus require-
ment as a limitation on the government's ability to prosecute.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of the corporate scandals of the late twentieth and
early twenty-first centuries, the area of white collar crime has never
been more significant. A successful prosecution can not only vindi-
cate corporate fraud but also destroy the corporation itself and the
jobs that it provides. The high stakes of white collar crime demand
clear and cautious rules that provide prosecutors and courts alike con-
crete guidelines with which to make their decisions.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Aguilar and Arthur Andersen made its
intentions known by applying restrictive nexus requirements to the
§ 1503 Omnibus Clause and to the § 1512(b) noncoercive witness
tampering clause. Given the Court's appeal to culpability and nexus
requirement precedent in those cases, the importance of having clear
rules, and the necessity of limiting criminal statutes to avoid criminal-
298 Jeffries, supra note 294, at 190 ("It is, as Herbert Packer said, 'the first principle' of
the criminal law, of 'central importance' in academic discussions of the subject, and all-but-
universally complied with in this country." (quoting HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCrION 79-80 (1968))).
299 Id. (citing PETER W. Low, JOHN CALVIN JEFFRIES, JR. & RICHARDJ. BONNIE, CRIMINAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 36 (1982)).
300 See id. at 195 ("[T]he concerns of legality... arise under the subsidiary doctrines of
vagueness and strict construction-doctrines that, although of very different origin, are
used today to implement the legality ideal.").
301 Id. at 196.
302 SINGER, supra note 295, at 125; see also United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) (describing the rule of lenity as "perhaps not much less old than
construction itself').
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izing innocent behavior, the nexus requirement should apply to
Sarbanes-Oxley's additions to obstruction ofjustice in §§ 1512(c) and
1519. The stakes are simply too high to not take the Court's restric-
tions seriously.
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